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This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of a novel bidding algorithm that a
softwareagentcanusetoobtainmultiplegoodsfrommultipleoverlappingEnglishauctions.Specif-
ically, an Earliest Closest First heuristic algorithm is proposed that uses neurofuzzy techniques to
predict the expected closing prices of the auctions and to adapt the agent’s bidding strategy to
reﬂect the type of environment in which it is situated. This algorithm ﬁrst identiﬁes the set of
auctions that are most likely to give the agent the best return and then, according to its attitude
to risk, it bids in some other auctions that have approximately similar expected returns, but which
ﬁnish earlier than those in the best return set. We show through empirical evaluation against a
number of methods proposed in the multiple auction literature that our bidding strategy performs
effectively and robustly in a wide range of scenarios.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence—Intelligent agents; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce
General Terms: Algorithms, Design, Experimentation
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1. INTRODUCTION
Online auctions are increasingly being used for a variety of e-commerce appli-
cations [He et al. 2003]. This widespread adoption means there are invariably
multiple auctions selling the desired good or service at the same time (for exam-
ple, on eBay alone, there are typically over 13, 000 auctions for digital cameras
at any one time). Moreover, it is frequently the case that there is a need to
buy multiple goods from these multiple auctions. For example, buying a ﬂight
from one auction and booking a corresponding hotel from another or buying a
car from a variety of cars for sale online. Given the fact that there is a huge
search space, it is important to provide automated tools that can monitor rele-
vantauctions,compareandmaketrade-offsbetweentheofferings,decidewhich
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auctions to bid in, and determine what bids to place in the chosen auctions in
ordertoobtainthebestdeals[Kephart2002].Softwarewhichcanautonomously
and ﬂexibly achieve these tasks on behalf of a particular user is here termed a
software agent [Jennings 2001].
Against this background, this article develops a heuristic bidding algorithm
that a software agent can use to bid across multiple English auctions (with
varying start and end times) in order to obtain multiple independent goods.1
In this context, an English auction is one in which a single good is on offer
and the auctioneer starts with his reserve (minimum acceptable) price and
solicits successively higher (public) bids from the bidders and the last bidder
remaining in the auction is the winner. We focus on English auctions because,
although there are millions of different types of auction [Wurman et al. 2001]
that can be used for e-commerce, the English auction is by far the most common
[Lucking-Reiley 2000]. In our case, each such English auction is assumed to sell
a single unit of the desired good and this good may be described by multiple
attributes2 (for example, in auctions selling ﬂights, the goods can be described
by their dates of departure and return, by their carrier, and the class of ticket
being bought). We only consider the case where the agent buys multiple inde-
pendent goods from such auctions; thus the failure to obtain one instance of the
good does not inﬂuence the availability or desirability of other goods. Moreover,
bids for these goods must be at least h(a) pounds sterling (hereafter shortened
to pound) larger than the previous price to be valid. Then if an agent bids suc-
cessfully, it becomes the active agent that is holding the bid. It may, of course,
be subsequently outbid. Auctions respond to any bid before they close and their
good is allocated to the active bid holder when the auction closes.
In a stand-alone English auction where there is not a hard deadline, the
bidding strategy is simple. The agent’s dominant strategy (the best thing to do,
irrespective of what the others do) is to bid the smallest allowable minimum
amount more than the current highest bid and stop when the user’s valuation
is reached. By adhering to this dominant strategy, the good is always allocated
to the bidder with the highest valuation. However, when there are multiple
auctions running at the same time, bidding is much more complex and has
much greater uncertainty. This is because (i) the auctions have varying start
and end times (thus comparisons need to be made between auctions that are
nearing completion (and probably have a high ask price) and auctions that
are near the beginning (and probably have a low ask price); (ii) the partici-
pating agents are likely to adopt a variety of different strategies (for example,
some may bid aggressively in the earlier auctions in order to ensure they get
the desired goods, while others may wait until later auctions to see if they
can obtain bargains), and (iii) the agents are likely to have different sets of
1The goods are actually substitutes in the sense that if the agent fails to buy an item in one of
the auctions, it can bid in the other auctions if they are still running. Moreover, we assume the
agent is tasked with obtaining multiple such goods from a number of different auctions. These
multiple goods are independent in the sense that the failure to buy one of them does not inﬂuence
the purchase of the others.
2The goods have multiple attributes, but the buyer agents bid only on price. Thus, our work differs
from the case where agents bid on multiple attributes (as discussed in Section 6).
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 6, No. 4, November 2006.A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Buying Multiple Goods • 467
auctions that they consider bidding in (driven by their own deadlines), thus
the set of agents in a given auction will vary and so, consequently, will the
supply/demand.
In some variants of the English auction, there is a strict deadline for when
the auction will ﬁnish and this promotes a strategy of trying to place a bid at
the last moment so that no other agent has a chance to place a higher bid (this
is called sniping [Rust et al. 1991]). To counteract such end effects, our auctions
have a soft deadline; that is, they do not close until a ﬁxed period after the last
bidisplaced(asperYahoo!AuctionsandAuctionUniverse).Thismeanssniping
is not effective and the auctions are akin to the standard English one. Moreover,
we consider the case where the agent wants to purchase multiple goods from
the ongoing auctions because this is a more general case than just purchasing
a single item. In practice, an agent may require multiple goods either because a
single owner wants multiple items or because multiple owners have combined
forces in a form of group buying [Tsvetovat and Sycara 2000]. In the latter
case, the agent also needs to allocate the goods it has purchased or is currently
holding to the various customers in order to maximise its return.
Given this context, we have developed (for the ﬁrst time) a heuristic bid-
ding algorithm that buys multiple units of the desired good from the available
auctions. This algorithm operates in the following way. It calculates what it
believes are the best set of auctions to bid in (it does this by predicting the auc-
tions’ closing prices using a fuzzy neural network, allocating the goods to the
customers it is acting on behalf of, and then calculating the satisfaction degree
of the allocation). However the prediction of this best set of auctions is highly
uncertain because it depends on the strategies, proﬁles, and reservation prices
of an arbitrary set of agents. Therefore rather than just bidding in this set, an
agent could also decide to bid in other auctions that are likely to have broadly
the same outcome because, by doing so, its chances of obtaining the goods are
increased (more places to buy from) and the likely satisfaction degree compared
with what is believed to be the best ones is still reasonably high.
In more detail, our algorithm adopts the heuristic of bidding in the expanded
set of auctions (the best set, plus those that have a broadly similar satisfaction
degree) in the order of increasing auction end time. Thus we term it an Ear-
liest Closest First (ECF) algorithm. Moreover, as the goods are composed of
multiple attributes, the agent may have to make trade-offs between them in
its bidding in order to best satisfy the user’s preferences. Thus, for example, a
user may ideally wish to ﬂy out on a Saturday, return the following Wednesday
and ﬂy with British Airways, but would be willing to accept (for a lower price)
ﬂight dates of Friday and Wednesday with Quantas (a BA partner). To allow
such ﬂexibility (or imprecision), we choose to model preferences using fuzzy
sets (since they have a proven track record for such tasks ([Luo et al. 2003,
Zadesh 1965, 1975]). Speciﬁcally, the agent’s preferences are private informa-
tion that include (i) valuations v for the good (expressed as fuzzy sets); (ii) the
ratingsfordifferentvaluesofthegood’sattributes(expressedasfuzzysets);and
(iii)theweightswhichbalancethevaluationandtheotherattributes.Bymeans
of an example, consider the case of a student who wants to buy a ﬂight ticket
to New York. She prefers to buy a “cheap” ticket (cheap is a fuzzy term). Thus
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the lower the price, the higher her degree of satisfaction. Ideally she wants to
depart on “Saturday,” but it is acceptable to go on Friday or Sunday. Here, the
date can be denoted as a triangular fuzzy number [He et al. 2003], where Satur-
day has the highest satisfaction degree, and “Friday” and “Sunday” have lower
ones. The airlines she likes can also be a fuzzy number where the memberships
of the fuzzy set “like” are given by her satisfaction on the airlines. Finally, she
can express the relative importance of the attributes of price, date, and airline
by assigning them the appropriate weights.
To cope with the uncertainty inherent in the multi-auction context and to
make trade-offs between the different variants of the goods available is a com-
plex decision making problem. Ideally the closing price of the auctions would
be known ﬁrst in order to calculate the satisfaction degree of a bid. However,
since the closing price is only known after the auction is closed, it is important
for the agent to make predictions about the likely closing prices of the various
auctions. By so doing, the agent can determine whether it should place a bid at
the current moment or it should delay because better deals might subsequently
become available. In our previous work, we successfully used adaptive fuzzy in-
ference methods for this task in continuous double auctions (CDA) [He et al.
2003] and the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) [He and Jennings 2004]. How-
ever, in both cases, the parameter adaptation of the fuzzy rules was somewhat
limited. For example, our agent for the CDA can only adapt its parameters in
a single direction of change (for example, all the parameters are bigger in a
competitive environment). However this is inappropriate for the multi-auction
context because each parameter in the strategy should be adjusted according
to its actual direction of change (for example, the center of the membership
function for the fuzzy set “medium” may need to go up, and the corresponding
width may need to go down to reﬂect the fact that this fuzzy set should cover a
smaller range of higher values). To rectify this, we exploit fuzzy neural networks
(FNNs) [Jang 1993] since these can do the fuzzy reasoning and, through learn-
ing, can adjust the parameters of the fuzzy terms and the consequent output as
the auctions progress. This adaptation enables the agent’s bidding behavior to
better reﬂect the current state of its environment (hereafter we call this strat-
egy FNN and the agent using this strategy an FNN Agent3). We choose FNN
for a number of reasons (1) As with a regular neural network, it can adapt its
parameters to better ﬁt the prevailing situation which cannot readily be deter-
mined a priori. (2) In contrast to a regular neural network, it is easier to put
prior knowledge about the domain into the system (via the fuzzy rules), and
this speeds up the learning process. (3) An FNN is easier to interpret than a
standard neural network (because the output is obtained based on rules), and
so it is easier to understand how and why the output is as it is.
The work described in this article advances the state of the art in the follow-
ing ways. First, we develop for the ﬁrst time an agent bidding algorithm (ECF)
3Toclarify,anagentthatusestheECFbiddingstrategyneedstopredicttheauctions’closingprices.
Inourcase,thisisachievedviaaFNN(althoughothermethodscouldbeusedinthefuture).Indeed,
in Section 5, we do use an alternative method for making this prediction, but retain the same ECF
strategy as per the FNN agent benchmarking purposes.
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for obtaining multiple goods from multiple overlapping English auctions. We
believe this strategy is usable in a wide variety of e-commerce settings because
it is based on readily observable information that can be found in many auc-
tion settings and because the underlying heuristic of bidding in auctions that
have broadly similar expected returns is also widely applicable. Second, fuzzy
neural networks are developed that can make predictions about the closing
prices and adapt the parameters in the neural network through both ofﬂine
and online learning to suit the environment the agent is situated in. Through
empirical evaluation the agent that uses ECF combined with the FNN is shown
to be effective in a wide range of situations. Finally, by exploiting a fuzzy set
representation of the user’s preferences, the strategy is able to make trade-
offs between the various attributes of the goods the agent purchases and can
cope with the inherent imprecision/ﬂexibility that often characterises a user’s
preferences.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the ECF
bidding algorithm, and Section 3 describes the FNN implementation. Section 4
gives an example of a ﬂight auction scenario in which the operational effective-
ness of our algorithm is evaluated. Section 5 actually provides the systematic
empirical evaluation of the strategy and benchmarks it against a number of
strategies that have been proposed in the literature. Section 6 discusses the
related work in multiple auction bidding, multi-attribute auctions, and fuzzy-
based bidding methods. Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents avenues for
future research.
2. THE EARLIEST CLOSEST FIRST BIDDING ALGORITHM
This section details the ECF algorithm. First, however, we introduce some spe-
ciﬁc terms in our auction context and then the algorithm is described.
There are multiple auctions in the market, each selling one unit of good.
There are three states for each auction (i) waiting: before its start time, nothing
happensinthisauction;(ii)running:theauctionisopenforbids;and(iii)closed:
the auction ﬁnishes when the market time is bigger than the auction’s closing
time and there have been no active bids in the auction for a ﬁxed period.
Each agent aims to buy multiple goods, thus it considers bidding if and only
if the sum of the bids it holds (that is, those auctions in which it is the active
bidder) and owns (closed auctions in which the agent won) is less than the num-
ber of good it desires.4 If it decides to bid, the agent needs to determine which
auctions it should bid in. To do so, it ﬁrst determines the auctions that best
satisfy the user’s preferences (calculation is detailed in Section 3.1) given its
expectation about the closing prices of each auction. Then, rather than placing
a bid in the selected auctions immediately, it bids in auctions that close earlier
than the selected auctions and have an evaluation “close” (a fuzzy term) to that
of the selected auctions. The intuition here is that, given the signiﬁcant degrees
of uncertainty that exist, precise calculations about the closing prices are sim-
ply not reliable and an auction that appears slightly less promising may well
4Thecasewheretheagentbidsinmoreauctionsthanthenumberofgoodsitwantsisnotconsidered
here.
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Fig. 1. The Earliest Closest First bidding algorithm.
turn out to be comparable or even better. Given this, the agent should consider
bidding in auctions that have broadly similar expected returns so as to increase
its chances of obtaining the item (by participating in more auctions), while en-
suring the likely return is one of the highest. Thus, for each good it desires, if
there are such close auctions, the agent will bid in the selected auctions in order
of increasing closing time that is, bid ﬁrst in the one that is going to close ﬁrst,
then in the one that will close next, and so on (hence the name Earliest Closest
First). The degree of closeness that is required to trigger bidding is captured
by the threshold (λ ∈ [0, 1]). Thus if the difference is within λ, the agent will
bid in the auction. In this sense, the choice of λ represents the risk attitude of
the user. If λ is high, the agent can be viewed as being risk averse because it
bids in many more auctions in order to maximise its chance of getting the good
(although it is likely to get a less satisfactory set of goods because it may accept
a higher ask price). If λ is low, the agent is taking a greater risk because it is
trying to obtain a high degree of satisfaction (but by not bidding in as many
auctions, it has a lower chance of actually being successful). If λ is somewhere
in between, the agent is striking a balance between the two positions.
In more detail, the decision making algorithm ECF is given in Figure 1. In
thisalgorithm,nactive,nown,andndemand arethenumberofgoodstheagentholds,
owns, and desires, respectively. An explanation of the algorithm’s key functions
is as follows.
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—The function of AuctionRunning (line 1) returns true if there are still avail-
able auctions to bid in, false otherwise.
—The function of update() (line 2) returns changes in the auctions since they
were last monitored. Such changes include whether the agent is holding an
active bid or has obtained the good, the updated ask price of each auction,
the transaction price for any auctions that recently closed, and the number
of auctions left to bid in.
—The function of predict() (line 3) predicts all auction’s closing prices given the
current market situation and the history transaction prices. The agent uses
a FNN to predict the closing prices in this article (see Section 3.1).
—The function of allocate() (line 4) allocates all the goods the agent owns and
possibly owns to its user according to their preferences. The later includes
the goods the agent holds in waiting or running auctions. The way that we
assign the auction to the user is through an assignment algorithm discussed
in Section 3.4.
—The function of toBid(g) (lines 6, 7 and 16) returns the auction ID of the
auction in which good g is believed to have the highest degree of satisfaction
given the prediction of the closing prices. This is the output of the allocation
in allocate(). If there is a best auction for buying good g given the allocation,
the returned value will be the auction ID; otherwise, the agent will bid in
any auction in which the current satisfaction degree is positive.
—ThefunctionofRunningAuctions()(line12)returnsalist Lofallthecurrently
running auctions in ascending order of their end times.
—The function of evaluate(a, g) (lines 7 and 15) returns the evaluation of auc-
tion a given the agents’ preference for good g at its current ask price. This
evaluation balances both price and the other attributes of the goods using a
fuzzy aggregation method (see Section 3.3).
—The function of chkThreshold() (line 17) returns the threshold parameter for
theagentgiventhecurrentsituationoftheauctionmarket.Thethresholdλis
determinedbythenumberofauctionsthathaveapositivesatisfactiondegree
for the agent in the market at that particular moment in time. Here the
general rule for choosing λ is: the more such auctions there are, the smaller
λ should be. This captures the intuition that, if there are many chances for
the agent to win the good, it can have a higher threshold so that it will have
a higher satisfaction degree for the purchased goods (and vice versa). The
experiments in Section 5.4 show the effect of different λs on the performance
of the agent.
—The function of bid(a) (lines 19 and 23) places a bid in auction a. The price
to place is the ask current price of the auction plus the bid step h(a).
To realize this algorithm, a number of prediction techniques are needed
(line 3). Here we use fuzzy neural networks (for the reasons outlined in
Section 1) and their application is discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Moreover,
an evaluation method is needed for ranking the various auctions (Section
3.3), and a good allocation method is needed to decide which auctions should
be assigned to which user (Section 3.4). However, in other applications, a
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Fig. 2. Reference price (pref) calculation for the FNN. getRelPrice(i) returns the average trans-
action price of all the auctions (with the same attributes as auction i) that have closed since the
agent started bidding. getAvgPrice(i) returns the historical average transaction price in the history
for auctions (with the same attributes as auction i).
range of other technologies could be used to achieve the objectives of the ECF
algorithm.
3. THE FNN IMPLEMENTATION
This section details the FNN implementation of the ECF algorithm. First, we
describe how the FNN is structured and how it operates to obtain the predicted
closing price. Second, the learning algorithm of the FNN is described. Third,
thewayofevaluatingauctionsisintroduced.Finally,theallocationmethodthat
allocates the goods to the user is given.
3.1 FNN Prediction
To reason about the expected closing price of each auction, the FNN agent
considers a per auction reference price (pref), the order in which the auctions
are due to close (oauction), and the number of alternative auctions (nauction) where
the similar item is available. Here the reference price represents a likely value
at which the auction will close for that particular variant of the good [He et al.
2003]. It is computed by considering the transaction prices of auctions that
have previously sold the speciﬁed good and the average transaction price in the
history records for the speciﬁed good (see function getRefPrice(i) in Figure 2).
The FNN agent records such data examples and removes some of the oldest
data to ensure it only learns based on the latest data. After each game ﬁnishes,
the agent adjusts the parameters to better reﬂect the prevailing circumstances
(see Section 3.2).
Topredicttheclosingpricesoftheauctions,fuzzyreasoningisused.Through
analyzing our experimental data, we found that the reference price, auction’s
closing order, and the number of substitute auctions are closely correlated with
the actual closing prices.5 Thus, fuzzy rules (deﬁned in Table I) are designed
to capture the relation among these factors. In particular, pref is expressed
using the fuzzy linguistic terms high, medium and low; oauction is expressed by
early, medium and late; and nauction is expressed by big, medium and small.
The consequent output is expressed as the integer numbers very high, high,
medium and low.
Thus, the FNN agent takes three inputs (pref, oauction, nauction) and has one
output (the expected auction closing price pclose). According to the rule base just
5In the future, we may consider adding other attributes, but our current analysis indicates these
parameters are the main determinants of outcome.
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Table I. The FNN Agent’s Rule Base
R1:I f pref is high and oauction is early and nauction is small then pclose is very high.
R2:I f pref is high and oauction is early and nauction is medium then pclose is very high.
R3:I f pref is high and oauction is early and nauction is big then pclose is high.
R4:I f pref is high and oauction is medium and nauction is medium then pclose is high.
R5:I f pref is high and oauction is medium and nauction is big then pclose is medium.
R6:I f pref is high and oauction is late and nauction is medium then pclose is medium.
R7:I f pref is high and oauction is late and nauction is big then pclose is low.
R8:I f pref is medium and oauction is early and nauction is small then pclose is very high.
R9:I f pref is medium and oauction is early and nauction is medium then pclose is high.
R10:I f pref is medium and oauction is early and nauction is big then pclose is medium.
R11:I f pref is medium and oauction is medium and nauction is medium then pclose is medium.
R12:I f pref is medium and oauction is medium and nauction is big then pclose is low.
R13:I f pref is medium and oauction is late and nauction is medium then pclose is low.
R14:I f pref is medium and oauction is late and nauction is big then pclose is very low.
R15:I f pref is low and oauction is early and nauction is small then pclose is high.
R16:I f pref is low and oauction is early and nauction is medium then pclose is medium.
R17:I f pref is low and oauction is early and nauction is big then pclose is low.
R18:I f pref is low and oauction is medium and nauction is medium then pclose is low.
R19:I f pref is low and oauction is medium and nauction is big then pclose is very low.
R20:I f pref is low and oauction is late and nauction is medium then pclose is very low.
R21:I f pref is low and oauction is late and nauction is big then pclose is very low.
Fig. 3. Overview of the FNN architecture.
mentioned, we developed a FNN with 5 layers (as shown in Figure 3). The input
variables correspond to the nodes in layer 1. The nodes in layer 2 correspond
to individual rules for reasoning about the closing prices of the auctions. Nodes
in layer 3 calculate the relative importance (weight) of each of these rules. The
nodes in layer 4 combine the output of each rule into the overall output. Finally,
the node in layer 5 sums up all the outputs in layer 4 and gives the predicted
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auction closing price. In more detail:
—Layer 1. Each node in this layer generates the membership degrees of a
linguistic label for each input variable (for example, reference price is low or
there are a large number of substitute auctions in the market). Speciﬁcally,
the ith node performs the following (fuzziﬁcation) operation:
O
(1)
i = μAi(x) = e
−
(x−ci)2
2δ2
i + γ, (1)
where O(1) is the output of layer 1 (that is, the membership degree with
respect to the corresponding fuzzy sets), x is the input to the ith node, and Ai
is the linguistic value (high, medium, low, etc.) associated with this node. The
set of parameters (ci, δi) determines the shape of the membership function.6
These parameters can be adapted by learning (as we will explain in Section
3.2).γ isaverysmallnumber(herewechoose0.00001)thatavoidstheoutput
in layer 1 from becoming zero.
—Layer 2. Each node in this layer calculates the ﬁring strength (the mimimum
of all the inputs, and it is in the range of [0, 1]) of each rule (in Table I) via
the multiplication operation:
O
(2)
i = wi =  j∈S
(1)
i {μAj}, (2)
where S
(1)
i is the set of nodes in layer 1 which feed into node i in layer 2, and
wi is the output of this node (that is, the strength of the corresponding rule).
—Layer 3. The ith node of this layer calculates the ratio of the ith rule’s ﬁring
strength to the sum of all rules’ ﬁring strengths:
O
(3)
i = w 
i =
wi  
j∈S(2) wj
, (3)
where S(2) is the set of nodes in layer 2. This ratio indicates the relative
importance of each rule.
—Layer 4. The ith output of the node is calculated by:
O
(4)
i = ri
 
j∈S
(3)
i
w 
j, (4)
where j ∈ S
(3)
i is the set of nodes in layer 3 that feed into nodei. The output of
thislayercombinesalltheoutputsoftherulesthathavethesameconsequent
output.
—Layer 5. The single node in this layer aggregates the overall output of the
FNN (that is, pclose) as the summation of all incoming signals:
O(5) =
 
i∈S(4)
⎛
⎝ri
 
j∈S
(3)
i
w 
j
⎞
⎠, (5)
where j ∈ S(4) is the set of nodes in layer 4.
6Here we assume that this is a Gaussian function. This is because it has nonzero derivatives
throughout the universe of discourse and is therefore easy to implement. Also, the derivatives of a
Gaussian function are continuous and smooth, thus, it can produce good training performance.
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Giventhenatureofthisdecisionmakingtask,itisimportantthatthevarious
parameters of the FNN algorithm ﬁt the prevailing context as accurately as
possible. This is achieved through combined learning (see Section 3.2 for more
details). To start, a number of simulated games7 are used to set the initial
parameters of the FNN. After this, the agent can be used in an operational
settingtoactuallypurchasegoods.Theagentkeepstrackofthevariousauctions
and records the latest data which is then combined with the old data. The
combined data set is fed into the FNN as new training examples. However,
these examples are weighted more highly than older ones and so enable the
agent to better reﬂect prevailing circumstances (but without being completely
reactionary to the last set of changes).
To illustrate the operation of this architecture consider the following exam-
ple.Letthereferencepriceforthenextauctiontobidinbe pref = 20,andassume
that it will be the fourth one to close oauction = 4. Suppose there are 8 substitute
auctions. Thus (20, 4, 8) is fed into the FNN. Let these values be assigned the
following membership degrees of the following fuzzy sets: medium (20) = 0.8,
late (4) = 0.7 and big (8) = 0.5 (from (1)). These values are then the respective
outputs of nodes 2, 6 and 7 in layer 1. Then, taking R14 as an example, the
output of node R14 in layer 2 is 0.8×0.7×0.5 = 0.28 (from (2)). Then, suppose
the sum of all the ﬁring strengths in layer 2 is 3. The weight of R14 (output of
w14) will be 0.28/3 = 0.093 (from (3)). Thus, R14 contributes 0.093 among all
the rules. After this, in layer 4, there are 3 rules that have the same consequent
output, which is very low, that is, R14, R19, R20, and R21 (from Figure 3). Let
rvery low = 12, w19 = 0.1, w20 = 0.1, and w21 = 0.1. In which case, the output of
node very low is 12 × (0.093 + 0.5 + 0.2 + 0.1) = 10.72 (from (4)). Finally, the
output of layer 5 is the sum of all the outputs of layer 4 (using Equation (5))
one of which will be the 10.72 coming from the very low node.
Finally, to guarantee the predicted closing price is alway higher than the
current ask price, the predicted auction closing price will be
P∗
close = max{pclose, pnow}, (6)
where pclose is the output of the FNN and pnow is the current ask price of the
auction.
3.2 FNN Learning
Given the training data xi (i = 1, 2, 3), the desired output value Y , and the
fuzzy logic rules (from Table I), the parameters of the membership functions
for the FNN’s input variables are adjusted by supervised learning. Here the
7The initial parameters of the FNN can either be set directly by the user or can be set by playing
simulated games. A simulated game is played by strategies or humans in a test environment where
the various agents compete but money does not actually change hands. In the cases where such
gamesarenotavailable,userscanmonitorrealauctionWebsites(suchaseBay)andcollectrelevant
data (since the trading history of most auction sites is readily available). However, if the user is
conﬁdent about their parameter settings, the agent can be put directly into practice without going
through the simulated games.
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goal is to minimize the error (E) function for all the trainings
E =
 
j
1
2
 
Y j − O
(5)
j
 2, (7)
where Y j is the actual closing price of pattern8 j, and O
(5)
j is the predicted
closing price of the FNN for pattern j. For each set of training data, starting
at the input nodes, a forward pass is used to compute the activity levels of
all the nodes in the network. Then starting at the output nodes, a backward
pass is used to compute ∂E
∂O for all the hidden nodes. In our FNN agent, the
parameters that get adjusted during learning are the consequent output of
each rule (ri in layer 4) and the center and width of the Gaussian membership
functions for each of the fuzzy terms (ci and δi in layer 1). For the parameters
of r, the learning rule of the FNN agent is based on standard gradient descent
optimization [Rumelhart et al. 1986]
r(t + 1) = r(t) + η
 
−
∂E
∂r
 
, (8)
where η is the learning rate (η ∈ [0.001, 0.01]).
Thus, the learning rule for adjusting the parameters of ri in layer 4 and (ci,
δi)i nl a y e r1
∂E
∂ri
=
∂E
∂O(5)
∂O(5)
∂O
(4)
i
∂O
(4)
i
∂ri
= (O(5) − Y )
 
j∈S
(3)
i
w 
j, (9)
Hence ri is updated by:
ri(t + 1) = ri(t) − η(O(5) − Y )
 
j∈S
(3)
i
w 
j. (10)
For parameters ci and si, the conjugate gradient algorithm [Johansson et al.
1990] is used since it is shown to be faster than the standard gradient descent
optimization [Rumelhart et al. 1986]. Here suppose α is the parameter we are
interested in and the gradient of iteration t of the learning is gt (t > 1), then
the new search direction is to combine the new steepest descent direction with
the previous one, that is,
pt =−gt + βt pt−1, (11)
where by using Fletcher-Reeves [Fletcher and Reeves 1964] update,
βt =
gT
t gt
gT
t−1gt−1
. (12)
Thus, the adaptive rule of ci in layer 1 is as follows (where S
(2)
−i means the
set of nodes in layer 2 that are connected with node i in layer 1):
∂E
∂ci
=
 
m∈S
(2)
−i
 
∂E
∂O
(2)
m
∂O(2)
m
∂O
(1)
i
∂O
(1)
i
∂ci
 
8Here a pattern is a training example (for example, for the previous example, a pattern might be
{{20, 4, 8},1 0 .722}, where given the inputs {20, 4, 8} the actual output is a price of 10.722).
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=
 
m∈S
(2)
−i
⎛
⎝
 
k∈S
(3)
−m
 
∂E
∂O
(3)
k
∂O
(3)
k
∂O
(2)
m
 
∂O(2)
m
∂O
(1)
i
∂O
(1)
i
∂ci
⎞
⎠, (13)
where
∂E
∂O
(3)
k
= (O
(5)
1 − Y )rk; (14)
∂O
(3)
k
∂O
(2)
m
=
   
k wk−wm
(
 
k wk)2 if k = m,
−wm
(
 
k wk)2 otherwise;
(15)
∂O(2)
m
∂O
(1)
i
=
wm
O
(1)
i
; (16)
∂O
(1)
i
∂ci
= e
−
(xi−ci)2
2δ2
i (xi − ci)
δ2
i
. (17)
So the adaptive rule of ci is:
ci(t + 1) = ci(t) + ηpt, (18)
where pt =−gt + βt pt−1 and gt = ∂E
∂ci .
Similarly,fromEquations(14),(15),and(16),theadaptiveruleofδi isderived
as:
∂E
∂δi
=
 
m∈S
(2)
−i
⎛
⎝
 
k∈S
(2)
−m
 
∂E
∂O
(3)
k
∂O
(3)
k
∂O
(2)
m
 
∂O(2)
m
∂O
(1)
i
∂O
(1)
i
∂δi
⎞
⎠, (19)
where
∂O
(1)
i
∂δi
= e
−
(xi−ci)2
2δ2
i (xi − ci)2
δ3
i
. (20)
Hence the adaptive rule of δi becomes
δi(t + 1) = δi(t) − ηpt, (21)
where pt =−gt + βt pt−1 and gt = ∂E
∂δi .
3.3 Evaluating the Auctions
Given the expected auction closing prices, the agent needs to make a deci-
sion about which auctions to bid in.9 For ease of expression, we present this
evaluation function for the case where only price and one other attribute of the
good are considered (but the concepts are equally applicable for arbitrary num-
bers of attributes). Given the user’s preference on price and other attributes
(as deﬁned in Section 1), the evaluations of the various factors need to be in-
tegrated. In fuzzy theory, the process of combining such individual ratings for
9Such an evaluation function is used to evaluate the bidding strategy that considers more than
one of the good’s attributes in making its bidding choice. Thus, for example, all the benchmark
strategies in Section 5 exploit such a function.
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an alternative into an overall rating is referred to as aggregation [Yager 1994].
Now let wp and wq be, respectively, the weight of price and the other attribute
that the agent is concerned with, and up be the evaluation with respect to price,
and uq the evaluation with respect to the other attribute. Intuitively, the role of
the aggregation operator is to balance up and uq and obtain an overall evalua-
tion up,q somewhere between the two values. There are three main aggregation
operators that are commonly used and each of them has different semantics
(conforming to different user objectives)
—Weighted average operator
up,q = upwp + uqwq. (22)
Using this operator means that even if one of the evaluations is very low, the
overall output can still be reasonably high. For example, if the user does not
like the time of the ﬂight but it is very cheap, the overall evaluation can still
be high.
—Weighted Einstein operator [Luo et al. 2003]
up,q =
u
 
puq
 
1 + (1 − u
 
p)(1 − u
 
q)
, (23)
where u
 
p = (up−1)wp, and u
 
q = (uq−1)wq. This equation ensures that if one
evaluation is not satisﬁed (that is, up = 0o ruq = 0), the overall evaluation is
0. Intuitively, this corresponds to the situation where both evaluations must
be satisﬁed more or less. For example, even if the ﬂight ticket is free, the
user cannot accept it since traveling after a speciﬁc date is totally useless
(for example, he has a very import meeting at a speciﬁc date).
—Weighted uninorm operator [Yager and Rybalov 1996]
up,q =
(1 − τ)u
 
pu
 
q
(1 − τ)u
 
pu
 
q + τ(1 − u
 
p)(1 − u
 
q)
, (24)
where u
 
p =
(up−1)wp
max{wp,wq}+1, and u
 
q =
(uq−1)wq
max{wp,wq}+1, τ ∈ (0, 1) is the unit element
of this operator. The unit element can be regarded as a threshold: if both
the evaluations are above the threshold, the overall evaluation is enhanced;
if both are less than the threshold, the overall evaluation is weakened; if
there is a conﬂict between the two evaluations, the overall evaluation is a
compromise. For example, if the user likes the date and price, the overall
evaluation is very high; if the user hates the date and price, the overall
evaluation is even lower; and if the user likes the date but hates the price,
then some intermediate value is chosen.
Since these operators are all plausible means of aggregating price and the
other attributes, and none is necessarily superior in all cases, we need to
empirically evaluate the impact of these operators on the performance of the
agents. This we do in Section 5.2.
3.4 Goods Allocation
The agent needs to allocate the goods it owns and potentially owns to its cus-
tomers in order to maximize the overall satisfaction degree (if there is a single
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customer,thenthisisatrivialstage).Thusgoodallocationtakesplaceeachtime
the agent accesses the market and when the market information has been up-
dated. The goods are allocated to the agent’s users optimally so as to maximize
the sum of the users’ satisfaction. Here this allocation process is regarded as
an assignment problem which we solve using a shortest augmenting path algo-
rithm [Jonker and Volgenant 1987] (this is commonly used to solve assignment
problems because of its stability and efﬁciency).
In more detail, suppose D is a d × d square,10
D =
⎛
⎝
s11 ··· s1d
···
sd1 ··· sdd
⎞
⎠,
where d is the number of auctions, and sij is the satisfaction degree of the user’s
jth requirement for auction ai:11
sij =
⎧
⎨
⎩
−evaluate(ai, g j)i f i ≤ ndemand,
99 if owns or holds a good in ai and j > ndemand
0 otherwise,
where 99 is used to avoid the owned goods being allocated to the dummy nodes.
Given this input, suppose an allocation X is
X =
⎛
⎝
x11 ··· x1d
···
xd1 ··· xdd
⎞
⎠,
where each row and each column has only a single 1 (that is, each auction is
only allocated to one user). Thus,
d  
j=1
xij = 1,
d  
i=1
xij = 1,
and the objective function to minimize is
d  
j=1
d  
i=1
(sijxij),
where xij = 0o r1 .
Using this method, the agent can decide how to allocate the goods it owns
and holds to its users optimally given the ask price or the predicted price of the
auctions. This assignment method is also used to calculate the performance of
the agents at the end of the game.
10Here a square is necessary in order to use the algorithm. The row represents the auction, and
the column represents the goods the agent desires. To use the algorithm, some dummy nodes may
need to be added to make a square so that the row number is equal to the column number.
11Our problem here is a maximization problem, but in order to use the shortest augmenting path
algorithm, we need to put a minus before the evaluation value.
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4. FLIGHT AUCTION SCENARIO
This section provides an intuitive scenario12 in which the operation of our ECF
algorithm can be exempliﬁed and its performance empirically assessed (see
Section 5). Here we consider how to model the user’s preferences as fuzzy sets,
outline the environmental setting for realizing the scenario, and present the
training results for the FNN agent.
In more detail, there are a number of airlines selling ﬂight tickets through
auctions. Each auction is selling one ﬂight ticket. Each software agent is acting
on behalf of one customer, and they are informed of the customer’s preferences
about prices and travel dates.13 The aim of the agent is to obtain the goods that
maximize the sum of its users’ satisfaction.
4.1 Users’ Preference Settings
We describe the valuation v of a customer for a ﬂight ticket as a trapezoid
shape fuzzy number (lbottom,ltop,rtop,rbottom), where lbottom = 0 and ltop = 0,
and rtop and rbottom are the values where the satisfaction starts to decrease and
where it becomes 0. In this case, the higher the price of the good, the lower the
satisfaction degree. When the price increases to the valuation of the agent, the
satisfaction degree is 0. The travel date q is represented as a triangular fuzzy
number14 (lq, cq,rq), where cq is the preferred date and lq and rq are the left
and right limits, respectively.15
By way of illustration, suppose a customer’s valuation for the ticket is about
300 pounds and she wants to travel on or about the 15th of December. These
preferences are expressed as fuzzy sets by the respective membership functions
μP and μQ given in Equations (25) and (26) and are shown graphically in
Figures 4 and 5.
μP(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1i f x ≤ 100,
300−x
200 if 100 < x < 300,
0i f x ≥ 300.
(25)
μQ(y) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
y−12
3 if 12 ≤ y ≤ 15,
18−y
3 if 15 ≤ y ≤ 18,
0i f y ≤ 12 or y ≥ 18.
(26)
12We choose (for reasons of familiarity) a ﬂight auction scenario where an agent is trying to buy
multiple ﬂight tickets on behalf of a user. This is a problem that we often meet in real life and it ﬁts
the requirements of our context as outlined in Section 1. It has also been used in the Trading Agent
Competition which is an international forum for benchmarking bidding strategies (see Section 6
for more details).
13For reasons of simplicity, we focus on the two attribute case. However, the principle is similar
with more attributes.
14Any kind of fuzzy number can be used here, for example, trapezoid or bell-shaped fuzzy numbers.
We choose a triangular one simply because it is the most commonly used.
15If a user has a crisp preference, for example, he has to travel on the 15th of December, the
similarity degree of the 15th is 1 and 0 otherwise.
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Fig. 4. Customer’s preference about price.
Fig. 5. Customer’s preference about travel date.
4.2 Experimental Settings
The experiments aim to cover a broad range of scenarios. All the parameters
about the environment are assigned at the beginning of the game. Here we
suppose that all auctions start at a price of 100, and all have a bid increment
of 10 pounds. Also
—a day in the game equals ζ = 5 seconds of real time16;
—an auction i’s starting time tstart
i is randomly chosen from a uniformly dis-
tributed range (0, (qi − 5)ζ). This ensures all the auctions start at least ﬁve
days before the travel date17;
—auction i’s end time is randomly chosen from a uniformly distributed range
(tstart
i + 2ζ,( qi − 3)ζ). This guarantees that the auctions close at least three
days before the travel date18;
—each agent is assigned to a customer which has n requirements, n ∈ [1, 8];
16The length of one day can be shorter if it can be guaranteed that all the agents have time to
respond in the market.
17We choose ﬁve to ensure the agent has a reasonable time to transact the ticket before the travel
date.
18We choose three to ensure that the start time of the auction is before the end time, and there is
a reasonably long time for the auction.
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Fig. 6. Learning curve: root mean square error versus time.
—all the agents start bidding at the beginning of the game19;
—auction i’s ﬂight date qi is chosen randomly from a uniformly distributed
range (11, 19);
—the valuation of the goods for a customer are randomly chosen from a uni-
formly distributed range (170, 370);
—a customer’s preferred travel date is randomly chosen from a uniformly dis-
tributed range (12, 18)20.
4.3 The FNN Agent’s Learning Algorithm
As discussed in Section 3.2, the agent engages in a period of ofﬂine learn-
ing in order to provide initial parameters for the FNN agent. In more detail,
Figure 6 shows the training and testing curves of the root mean square error
with respect to the number of training epochs.21 The errors are computed for
both the training set and the test set. After each game is played, the new game
data (test data) and the latest game data before this game (training set) are
input to the FNN for learning. After 100 training epochs, it can be seen that the
error between the target output and the actual output reaches its lowest point
and so the parameters settings of this point are those used when the agent
is made operational. Speciﬁcally, Figures 7 and 8 show, respectively, the com-
parison of the FNN parameters before and after training. As can be seen, the
parameters for each of the three inputs are adjusted from the original settings
deﬁned by the ﬁeld experts.
4.4 Parameter Adaptation in Different Environments
This section compares the parameter adaptation in two environments where
the supply is high (25 auctions) and low (15 auctions). Speciﬁcally, Figures 9
19This is because we want to evaluate all types of agents fairly. If some agents start bidding late,
they will be at a disadvantage compared with those who start bidding early.
20This range is smaller than the range of the auctions’ ﬂight dates because this preferred travel
date is a fuzzy number. Thus when defuzziﬁed, it will actually cover the full range of the ﬂight’s
dates.
21The reference price and ask price are scaled by dividing by 10 during learning. However, this
does not affect the result in any way. In the real-world scenario, the price can be any number.
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Fig. 7. Comparing antecedent membership functions (MFs) before (dashed line) and after (solid
line) ofﬂine learning.
Fig. 8. Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after (solid line)
ofﬂine learning.
to 12 show how the parameters are adjusted differently in different environ-
ments. In Figure 10, when supply is high, the closing prices tend to be low and,
thus, the consequent parameters are lower than the initial ones. In contrast, in
Figure 12, when supply is low, the closing prices tend to be high, and the con-
sequent parameters are higher than the initial ones.
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Fig. 9. Comparing antecedent membership functions (MFs) before (dashed line) and after (solid
line) ofﬂine learning in-high supply environment.
Fig. 10. Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after (solid line)
ofﬂine learning in a high supply environment.
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Fig. 11. Comparing antecedent membership functions (MFs) before (dashed line) and after (solid
line) ofﬂine learning in a low supply environment.
Fig. 12. Comparing consequent membership functions before (dashed line) and after (solid line)
ofﬂine learning in a low supply environment.
5. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
This section evaluates the FNN agent by comparing it in a variety of environ-
ments with other agents that use bidding strategies proposed in the literature.
In particular, we are interested in assessing the performance of each kind of
agent in different environments. There are three main groups of experiments,
and there are a number of sessions which correspond to experiments with
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different settings (as per Section 4.2). For each session, at least 200 games22
are played among the agents.
Since the number of agents in each experiment varies, the performance ρK
of a particular type K of agent (for example, FNN) is calculated as the average
satisfaction degree per agent of the kind K, that is:
ρK =
 nK
i
 mi
j u
(i)
j
nK
, (27)
where nK is the number of type K agents in the same game, u
(i)
j means the
evaluation of customer j, and mi is the number of customers of agent i. Since
most of the extant multi-auction bidding strategies are concerned solely with
price (see Section 6), we had to extend them to deal with bidding for goods that
are characterized by multiple attributes. Thus, in all cases, the agents used the
aggregation operators speciﬁed in Section 3.3 in order to make trade-offs be-
tween price and travel date. To deal with multiple goods, the allocation function
can decide which user bids in which auction. The speciﬁc benchmark strategies
we used are the following.
—Greedy (GRD) Strategy (adapted from Byde [2001a]). While the sum of the
number of goods held and owned is less than what the agent needs, bid in
auctions where the auction’s current satisfaction has the highest evaluation
(as deﬁned in Section 3.3);
—Fixed Auction (FIX) Strategy (adapted from Byde et al. [2002]). Select at the
beginning of the game the auctions in which bids will be placed, and then
only bid in these auctions. The auctions chosen here are those where the sum
of the users’ satisfaction is highest for date (at this time none of them have a
value for price). The agent continues bidding in its selected auction until the
price satisfaction degree equals zero, in which case it will switch to another
auction (until all those in the ﬁxed set have been tried).
—Average (AVG) Strategy. AVG also uses the ECF algorithm, but it uses a
muchsimplerpredictionfunctionbasedonthepasthistorytransactionprices
to predict the closing prices (that is, to implement the predict() function in
Figure 1). In more detail, it calculates the average closing prices of all the
auctions for each kind of good from the recent games. Suppose in the latest
N games, there are m auctions with attribute i, then the predicted closing
price of an auction with attribute i is
˜ p
(i)
close =
 m
j p
(i)
j
m
,
where p
(i)
j is the real closing price of auction j with attribute i.
5.1 Varying Agent Populations
This experiment aims to compare the performance of the different types of
agents when there are varying numbers of the other agent types in the popu-
lation (here the population size is ﬁxed). In this experiment, we studied three
22A t-test showed that 200 games are sufﬁcient to give a signiﬁcant ranking among the agents. A
p value of p < 0.05 is reported for all the experiments.
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environments:whensupplyislow(15auctions),medium(20auctions),andhigh
(25 auctions). When the weighted average operator is used and the weight ratio
is wp : wq = 1 : 1, Figure 13 shows the results when there are ﬁxed numbers of
each type of agent in a session (a), and when one type dominates numerically
(b) to (e).23
From this, it can be seen that the FNN agents perform better than other
agents in all the cases considered. We attribute this success to their ability to be
able to select the auctions to bid in according to the relatively correct prediction
ontheclosingpricesoftheauctions.Inmoredetail,theFNNagentisbetterthan
GRD agents. This is because the GRD agent endeavors to make a transaction
wheneveritcan.Itsmainshortcomingisthatitonlyconsidersongoingauctions
(it ignores those that have not yet started and so fails to consider the full set
of potential purchasing opportunities when making bidding decisions). Thus, it
sometimes buys a good at the user’s valuation price when, if it had waited, it
might well ﬁnd subsequent auctions with lower closing prices. The FIX agent
performs the worst because it only bids in auctions where it knows a priori
that it can get high satisfaction on the ﬂight date. This leads to a poor overall
performance because it misses auctions that have a high evaluation on price
but a lower one on date. As is shown in Figure 13, FIX agents have the smallest
transaction numbers.
It can also be seen from all the subﬁgures in Figure 13 that, when the supply
is high, all the agents have a higher performance value than when there is a
low supply. This is as expected because, in general, the auctions close at a lower
pricewhenthesupplyishigh(becausethereislesscompitition).InFigure13(b),
GRD agents dominate the market, and they often make the transaction price
of some auctions very high. Moreover, it can be seen from the performance in
Figure 13(b), when compared with other ﬁgures in Figure 13, that GRD agents
have a relatively worse performance value. When FIX agents dominate the
market (Figure 13(d)), all the other agents have a higher performance value
compared to the other cases in Figure 13. This is because the FIX agents only
bid in a small number of auctions. Thus other auctions have less competition
and, consequently, lower prices.
5.2 Varying Aggregation Operators
This experiment studies the impact on the different types of agents of the dif-
ferent ways of trading-off the price and travel date24 (see Figure 14). To do
this, the number of auctions is generated randomly in the range of [15, 25] and
the number of agents is 8. We also ﬁx the weight of wp : wq = 1 : 1 for each
23In (a), there are equal numbers of each agent, and we have 4 kinds of agents. There are 4 agents
and each agent desires 8 units of goods. In (b) to (e), there are 2 of one kind of agent and 1 of the
other three kinds. Thus, there are 5 agents in total, and each agent desires 7 units of goods.
24We do not believe it is appropriate to compare the performance between the different aggregation
operators. This is because the users’ intention in choosing the operators reﬂects different objectives
which are, in turn, reﬂected in the different semantics of the operators. The weighted average
operator is used to balance all the evaluations; the weighted Einstein operator to satisfy all the
evaluations more or less; and the weighted uninorm operator to compromise positive and negative
evaluations.
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Fig. 13. Performance of agent with various agent populations. The horizontal axis shows the total
auction number in the market. The vertical axis represents the performance of the kind of agents
in that session. The number on top of each bar is the number of transactions made per agent by
that kind of agents in the session. In (a), there are 4 agents in total, and 5 for (b) to (e). The demand
for (a) is 32 and 35 for (b) to (e).
operator (see Section 5.3 for experiments with differently weighted attributes).
This time, the numbers of each agent type in a given game are randomly
generated.
As can be seen, the FNN agents behave the best, and AVG agents behave sec-
ond in all cases. In fact, the order of performance of the four kinds of agent does
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Fig. 14. Performance of various agents using different aggregation operators.
not change for different aggregators. This shows that our FNN agent performs
best whatever aggregation operator is used. Again, we attribute this success of
FNN agents to the efﬁciency of the ECF algorithm and its ability to predict the
auction closing price and the parameter adaptation through learning.
5.3 Varying Preference Weights
This experiment evaluates the performance of the different agents when
they use varying weights for the different attributes of the goods. This is an
important issue to consider because, again, various weightings may lead to a
differentrankingofthestrategies.Thus,foreachoperator,weconductedexperi-
mentstotesttheimpactoftheweightsontheperformanceofvariousstrategies.
In this case, the number of auctions is generated randomly from [15, 25] and
Figure 15 shows the performance of the agents with the three representative
weights we consider. As can be seen, the order of each kind of agent does not
change for the different weight ratios. Again, in all cases, FNN agents per-
form the best, followed by AVG agents. This superior performance is due to the
efﬁciency of the ECF algorithm.
However, in Figure 15(a) and (b), we see that the GRD agents also perform
well when wp : wq = 1 : 3. This is because such agents always choose the
currently best candidate, and the one with a high satisfaction on date is usually
chosen.NotethatGRDagentsacceptanypricewithintheirbudgetline,thusthe
satisfaction degree on price is not always high. Thus, when date is valued more,
GRD agents tend to perform well. However, this advantage disappears when
price is valued more. This feature is less apparent when we use the uninorm
operator (see Figure 15(c)) since even when the satisfaction for one attribute is
high, the overall evaluation is not always high.
5.4 Varying Attitudes to Risk
This experiment aims to study the inﬂuence of the risk attitude on the per-
formance of the FNN agent. Speciﬁcally, we aim to ﬁnd the best conﬁguration
of risk attitude for an agent to adopt. Thus, for each kind of aggregation
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Fig. 15. Using weighted operators with varying weights.
operator, three risk attitudes are compared: risk-seeking, risk-neutral, and
risk-averse. For example, when the weighted average operator is used, the
threshold (λ in Figure 1) is 0.1 for a risk-seeking agent, 0.2 for a risk-neutral
agent, and 0.3 for a risk-averse agent. From Figure 16, we can see that, in
general terms, the higher the supply there is, the better the agent performs
(as was shown in the experiment in Figure 13). However, the general trend is
that risk-seeking agents perform better when supply is high, and a risk-averse
agent behaves better when supply is low. This is because when supply is high,
there is little competition among the agents, and a risk-seeking agent can
win in the auction it selects easily, while when supply is low, the game is very
competitive and a risk-averse agent can win a good whenever it is within the
threshold.
6. RELATED WORK
There are three strands of work that are directly related to what we have
described in this article. First, there is work on agents bidding in multiple
overlapping auctions. Second, there is work on multi-attribute auctions. Third,
there is work using fuzzy techniques to manage agent interactions. Each of
these is now dealt with in turn.
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Fig. 16. Performance of FNN agents with different risk attitudes.
First, we consider bidding in multiple overlapping auctions. In this area,
Preist designed an algorithm for agents that participate in multiple English
auctions [Preist et al. 2001]. His algorithm proposes a coordination mechanism
that can be used in cases where all the auctions terminate simultaneously and
a learning method that uses a belief function about the valuations of bidders
to tackle auctions that terminate at different times. It uses the belief function
and the payoff (provided the good is obtained) to calculate the expected util-
ity of a bid. However, an important shortcoming of this method is that it only
considers the transaction price and bids in the history of the auction house but
ignores the current state of the running auctions. Our ECF algorithm consid-
ers both factors. Moreover, his algorithm is only evaluated for cases where the
auctions completely overlap. Thus it is not clear how it would perform for cases
where there are varying start and end times. In a similar vein, Byde describes
a dynamic programming approach for agents that participate in multiple En-
glish auctions to buy a single item [Byde 2001b]. Moreover, in Byde [2001a],
the dynamic programming approach is compared with other algorithms and
shown to be effective in obtaining high utilities. However, we believe it is dif-
ﬁcult to extend this approach to a time-constrained environment (like many
e-commerce scenarios) because of the heavy computational demands of this
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technique. Building on this initial work, Byde et al. [2002] developed a frame-
work that enables an agent to make rational bidding decisions across multiple
heterogeneousauctions(English,Dutch,First-pricesealed-bidandVickreyauc-
tions) with varying start and end times. It does this by using a ﬁxed-auction
strategy (like the one we use in Section 5) and a ﬁxed threshold strategy to
estimate the expected utility of a bid in a probabilistic way. However, in many
cases, we believe it will prove difﬁcult to obtain the probability values required
for this model (for example, the probability that a given price will win an auc-
tion, and the probability that the highest opposing bid in the auction has a
value less than a given price). Our approach circumvents this issue by using
the fuzzy neural network to estimate the auction’s closing prices, and then se-
lecting the auction to bid in. Thus what we need for this reasoning model is
some training patterns collected from previous games, and we believe this in-
formation is easier to obtain than the aforementioned probability distribution
functions. Anthony and Jennings [2002] also propose an approach for agents to
bid for a single item in English, Dutch, and Vickrey auctions. The agent decides
what to bid based on the remaining time the number of remaining auctions,
the desire for bargain, and the desperateness of the agent. The overall strategy
is to combine these four tactics using a set of relative weights provided by the
user. In an extension to this model [Anthony and Jennings 2003], a genetic
algorithm is used to search for effective strategies so that an agent can behave
appropriately according to its assessment of its prevailing circumstances. How-
ever, this method does not calculate the expected closing price of the various
auctions. This means the agent has no well-founded basis for calculating the
maximum bid it can offer at any moment in time. In this sense, it is like the
Greedy strategy, but the agent will not accept a transaction with a low utility.
However, as our experiments highlight, such a strategy is unlikely to maximize
itssatisfactiondegreebecauseitoftenmissesoutonbetterdealsthatmayoccur
in the future.
All the strategies discussed involve price only in the negotiation. There is,
however, some work that involves trading with multi-attribute goods. In par-
ticular, the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) (http://www.sics.se/tac) provides
a platform for designers to develop software agents that can compete with one
another in multiple auctions for complimentary and substitutable goods. Each
participating agent simulates a travel agent with the goal of assembling a num-
ber of travel packages (ﬂight tickets, hotel rooms, and entertainment tickets)
for its eight customers. The key features of TAC are that there are 28 auctions
of three different types (one-seller English auctions; continuous double auc-
tion, and 16th price English auctions) and the goods are related (for example,
the customer stays in the same hotel for every night, and the outﬂight date
should be after the inﬂight data, etc). The objective of an agent is to maximize
the total satisfaction of its customers (that is, the sum of the customers’ util-
ities). In TAC, although there are some similarities with our scenario, there
are also important differences. In particular, the TAC involves multiple types
of auctions with interdependent goods. Moreover, their English auctions are
in a different form than those used in our context. Thus the strategies tend
to be speciﬁc to this competition context and cannot easily be used in more
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 6, No. 4, November 2006.A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Buying Multiple Goods • 493
general settings. Interestingly, however, Stone et al. [2003] designed a model
of the empirical price dynamics for this problem based on past data, and they
then use the model to analytically calculate the optimal bids. Moreover, Well-
man et al. [2004] surveyed various prediction techniques which were employed
by the TAC entrants. These approaches include historical averaging, machine
learning, and competitive analysis.
In a related area, Che [1993] investigates government procurement using a
two-dimensional auction (price and quality). In his work, a buyer solicits bids
from multiple sellers. Each bidder submits a sealed bid specifying the price
and quality, and the bidder with the highest score wins. Based on the different
ways in which the winner offers the goods/services, three auction schemes are
proposed: ﬁrst score (winner offers the price and quality it bids), second score
(winneroffersthegoods/servicesmatchingthescoreofthesecondhighestscored
bidder),andsecondpreferredoffer(winneroffersthegoods/servicesatthesame
price and quality as the second highest scored bidder). In this model, the buyer
evaluates the bids by a scoring function which converts a bid into a single
number.Otherworkonmulti-attributeauctionsincludesthedesignofabidding
procedure [Bichler et al. 1999], a multi-attribute auction protocol for service
allocation [Jennings et al. 2000], and the English auction protocol for multi-
attribute items [David et al. 2002]. However, in all cases, the difference with
our work is that the agent bids on price and quality, while our agent only bids
on price in the selected auctions where the other attributes are acceptable.
Wenowturntotheuseoffuzzytechniquestomanageanagent’sinteractions.
In this vein, Faratin et al. [2002] used fuzzy similarity to compute trade-offs
among multiple attributes during bilateral negotiations. Here fuzzy techniques
are used to deal with a bilateral negotiation, and the algorithm aims to ﬁnd
a win-win (cooperative) solution for both parties. Luo et. al [2003] developed
a fuzzy constraint-based framework for bilateral multi-issue negotiations in
semicompetitive trading environments. Fuzzy sets are used to express users’
preferences (as in our model), and a fuzzy aggregation method is used to evalu-
ate an offer. In previous work [He et al. 2003], we developed a fuzzy logic-based
bidding strategy for a continuous double auction and showed it outperformed a
number of the standard strategies for this problem. Our approach uses a fuzzy
reasoning technique to generate the bid or ask the agent can submit. But, as
discussed earlier, the parameter adaptation is somewhat limited. When taken
together, these models show that fuzzy techniques appear well suited to dealing
with complex negotiation and bidding strategies. Their success occurs because
fuzzy sets provide a natural way to ﬂexibly represent the terms for preferences
(for example, about 15 or less than 300) or factors involved in making bidding
decisions (for example, price is high or number of auctions is small) that involve
a high degree of uncertainty.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This article developed a new algorithm that guides an agent’s bidding behav-
ior in multiple overlapping English auctions for multiple items characterized
by multiple attributes. The Earliest Closest First algorithm we developed ﬁrst
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, Vol. 6, No. 4, November 2006.494 • M. He et al.
calculates the auctions that best ﬁt the users’ preferences, and then bids in
order of increasing end time in any auctions that have a satisfaction degree
that is reasonably close to what are predicted to be the best ones. Speciﬁ-
cally, the FNN implementation of this strategy uses neurofuzzy techniques
to predict the expected closing prices of the English auctions and to determine
which auction the agent should bid in at what time. The use of a fuzzy neural
network also allows the decision making criteria of our agent to be adapted
to the situation in which it ﬁnds itself. Speciﬁcally, the adaptation is based
on the learning of the neural network where the parameters in the fuzzy sets
and the consequent output can be adjusted. Moreover, we benchmarked our
algorithm against two common alternatives available in the literature and the
strategy which also uses ECF but with a different prediction function. In all the
cases we considered, the FNN strategy performs the best. This shows the effec-
tiveness of the ECF and the adaptation ability of the FNN implementation. Our
algorithmcanalsomaketrade-offsinitsbiddingbehaviorbetweenthedifferent
attributes that characterize the desired good in order to maximize the user’s
satisfaction.
For the future, there are ﬁve main extensions required for our model. First,
the algorithm can be extended to consider multiple attributes with interdepen-
dent attributes (for example, the hotel rooms are useful only after the day of
arrival). In this case, the fuzzy rule base will need to be expanded to deal with
the relation among attributes. Second, the FNN structure of the FNN agent (for
example, size of the linguistic terms and the fuzzy rules) is currently designed
by domain experts. Ideally, however, this structure should be obtained by self-
organized learning [Lin 1994] so users can employ it more readily. Third, the
ideaofECFcanbeextendedtootherauctionprotocols(forexample,Continuous
Double or Dutch auctions). In this case, we believe it is likely that the best asks
and bids can be calculated ﬁrst and then according to the current ask or bids,
the agent can decide whether to accept the ask/bid or submit a fuzziﬁed ask/bid.
Fourth, it would be desirable for the risk attitude parameter to be self-tuned.
Thus it could be adjusted according to how frequently the agent has transaction
or how eager it is to trade. Fifth, it is interesting to compare our FNN prediction
approach with other prediction techniques such as the Bayesian networks or
other form of neural network in this scenario. Inspired by MacKie-Mason et al.
[2004], and Walsh et al. [2002], which uses a game theoretic approach to ﬁnd
the dominant strategy or the most plausible equilibria, we intend to do some
similar experiments to compare the performance of our FNN agents with those
that are regular neural networks and Bayesian networks.
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